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Abstract— In this paper we propose a secure anonymous voting 
scheme (SAnoVS) for re-clustering in the ad-hoc network.  
SAnoVS extends our previous work of degree-based clustering 
algorithms by achieving anonymity and confidentiality of the 
voting procedure applied to select new cluster heads.  The 
security of SAnoVS is based on the difficulty of computing 
discrete logarithms over elliptic curves, the intractability of 
inverting a one-way hash function and the fact that only 
neighboring nodes contribute to the generation of a shared secret.  
Furthermore, we achieve anonymity since our scheme does not 
require any identification information as we make use of a 
polynomial equation system combined with pseudo-random 
coordinates.  The security analysis of our scheme is demonstrated 
with several attacks scenarios.examined with several attack 
scenarios and experimental results. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The self-organization and self-protection of autonomous 
wireless ad hoc networks remains open field for novel 
solutions. We address the self-organization of ad hoc networks 
by allowing the nodes to make independent decisions and to 
vote for their cluster head (CH) via the use of distributed re-
clustering algorithms. We address the protection of such 
clustered networks with the adoption of a conference key 
distribution system (CKDS) used to establish a shared 
symmetric key between the neighboring ad hoc nodes. The 
session key protects the ad hoc communications and especially 
the re-clustering procedure which is achieved with voting. The 
whole scheme is the Secure Anonymous Voting scheme 
(SAnoVS). 
A. Our contributions are: 
• Autonomous decisions: the ad hoc nodes use a 
weighted degree-based clustering criterion in order to 
choose a neighboring candidate to act as cluster head. 
The nodes vote for that candidate cluster head node. 
• Secure re-clustering: In SAnoVS an anonymous 
secured voting procedure is used to re-cluster the ad 
hoc network. The maximum number of votes collected 
is taken into account for the selection of a new local 
CH. The nodes use SAnoVS to securely communicate 
their autonomous votes (opinions).   
 
• Secure communications: SAnoVS encapsulates an 
anonymous CKDS scheme which establishes an 
ephemeral symmetric shared secret (session key) 
among the cluster members based on ECDLP and 
localization techniques. The votes sent to the CH node 
that initiated the voting procedure and the rest 
messages exchanged amongst the members can be 
symmetrically encrypted with this ephemeral session 
key. 
• Anonymous communication: SAnoVS does not require 
any node identification information as it makes use of 
a polynomial equation system with Langrage 
interpolation and node positioning. 
• Security vulnerabilities: SAnoVS overcomes the 
identified weaknesses of the previous CKDS as 
described in section II. 
II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORKS  
In this section we focus our review on previous CKDS. In 
[1] the CKDS concept was first introduced. In [2] a CKDS 
with user anonymity based on an algebraic approach was 
proposed with the use of one-way hash functions to hide the 
identities of the attendants. In [3] two improvements of [2] 
were proposed. In 2003 an ECDLP-based scheme was 
proposed in [4] (Yang et al. scheme). In this scheme the CK is 
randomly chosen by the chair person who then broadcasts to 
the attendants the values yi that belong to a linear curve. In 
2004 the authors of [5] (Lin et al. scheme) modified the Yang 
et al. scheme because it was vulnerable to the attack of easily 
solving a set of linear equations to acquire the session key. 
The authors of [5] proposed modification of the transmitted 
values yi as y′ = 	 h⨁y.  
In [6] (Kim et al. scheme) anonymity was achieved by 
introducing the Lagrange polynomial interpolation by which 
means even the chair person calculates the shared CK and also 
the Lagrange coefficients ci are broadcasted instead of the 
values yi. However, there are several weaknesses regarding 
those previous works:  
• Both schemes [4] and [5] do not really maintain the 
user anonymity since the values 	  or y
	distributed to 
the attendants are directly linked to their identity.  
• Trying to keep some kind of anonymity in [4] and [5] 
would lead to unnecessary computation costs for key 
recovery and key verification by all the attending users. 
• The scheme in [6] assumes that the private keys xi are 
distributed to the nodes through a secure channel, 
which is unsafe because increases the chances to solve 
the ECDLP.  
• In the polynomial interpolation used in Kim et al. 
scheme if n is small (i.e., five or less attending nodes) 
then the Lagrange polynomial would have a very small 
degree n − 1  and in conjunction with a poorly 
designed Elliptic Curve cryptosystem (ECC) it could 
be solved by an attacker.  
• The Kim scheme [6] still depends on the identities of 
the attendants for the calculation of the hash values h. 
• In the Kim scheme [6], if the private key xi is found by 
solving the ECDLP then an attacker (attendant or not) 
by brute force attack could find the corresponding 
identity and break the anonymity of the system 
(knowledge of who owns a specific private key). 
Considering the above weaknesses, it is essential to propose 
a new security anonymous scheme for re-clustering in ad 
hoc networks.  
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
In order to protect the voting scheme described in Part B of 
this section, where an ad-hoc cluster changes its head upon 
node decisions, we propose the SAnoVS scheme.  Our 
SAnoVS follows the same principles of a threshold secret 
sharing scheme (TSS) and consists of three efficient 
algorithms: the public parameter generation (PG), the dealer 
setup (DS) and the share combiner (SC), to distribute a share 
secret, which we refer to as conference key (CK).  
Public Parameter Generation (PG): Initially, each cluster 
head publicly chooses an elliptic curve E over a finite field 
GFq and a base point G of order p.  Then, each node secretly 
chooses pseudo-random coordinates, x, y ∈ 1, p − 1  that 
define a point Z,	and broadcasts the corresponding public key         
Q = ZG   to each node U ∈ A  (let A = U, U , … , U"# 
denote the set of all m nodes in the ad-hoc network). 
Dealer Setup (DS): In order the cluster head, U$ , to 
distribute the shared secret in cluster members B, it computes 
the pair-wise keys k$ = Z$Q shared with each U.  Then, U$ 
computes the hash value h = Hk$	||	Z$	||	Z	||	T			||	m  and 
constructs a polynomial with degree n − 1  using +  points  
h, Hh  by applying Langrage polynomial interpolation, 
similar to [9].  
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Hence, the shared secret is the constant value of (1),         
CK = cL.   Next, U$  computes the check value of the share 
secret and add a timestamp T, as V = HCK	||	Z$	||	T		 before  
U$ broadcasts the message: 
  
M = Z$, V, T, cS?, cS? , … , c           (2) 
 
In order to prevent small degree of polynomial which 
translates to small number of neighboring nodes, U$ generates 
additional pseudo-random coordinate pairs h, Hh  to 
increase the number of points available.  
Share Combiner (SC): In this stage, each U in the cluster 
receives the message M  and performs the share combiner 
recovery procedure, where only U ∈ B can recover the correct 
CK after Step1 to Step4.   
 
Step1. First, U  verifies the expiration of the received 
timestamp, T and if it is invalid, U  terminates the recovery 
process.   
Step2. Second, U  computes the shared pseudo-random 
coordinates with U$, as k$ = ZQ$.  
Step3. Third, U  computes h = Hk$	||	Z$	||	Z	||	T			||	m 
and solves CK from the following equality: 
 
Hh = cS?hS? + cS? hS? +⋯+ cx + cL	mod	p
V	WXYZ[\\] 	CK = cL = Hh − cS?hS? − cS? hS? −⋯−
cx		mod	p                                                                              (3) 
 
Step4. Finally, U checks the validity of CK by verifying  
 
HCK	||	Z$	||	T		 = V.           (4) 
 
Only a valid member of the cluster 	^ ∈ _ can recover the 
valid shared secret, CK, from the above equation with the use 
of session key k`	 	shared with U$.  In SAnoVS, we construct 
our polynomial without using identities and we compute the 
shared secret, CK, by using polynomial equation system in SC 
stage. Therefore, SAnoVS does not require any user 
identification information or unecessary computation costs for 
the attending members of the cluster. During the SAnoVS 
voting procedure the attending members cannot exchange their 
encrypted votes with the long-term session key k$ to choose 
the next cluster head but only with the ephemeral key CK to 
avoid chosen plaintext attacks. 
A. Local Candidate Selection 
The highest degree algorithm [7] is a well-known ad hoc 
clustering algorithm in which as local CH is selected the node 
with the maximum connectivity degree, i.e., the node having 
the maximum number of uncovered in-range neighbors 
(periodic broadcast hello messages are used by the ad hoc 
nodes for one-hop neighbor detection).  We adopt here for 
candidate selection a weighted clustering variable Vi which is 
a simplified variation of the clustering criterion defined in [8]. 
In more detail, we assume that the energy ei along with the 
connectivity degree di of each node i are included in the hello 
broadcasts.  Then, each node participating in the re-clustering 
procedure calculates the value of Vi for each neighbor i, 
including itself, by using the coefficient α (weighs degree and 
energy):  
a	 = b ∙ YdYefg + 1 − b ∙
Wd
Wefg            (5) 
 
The neighbor with the maximum Vi constitutes the CH 
candidate node, opinion that the participating node will 
communicate during the SAnoVS voting procedure.  
B. New Cluster Head Selection with Voting 
The re-clustering procedure (selection of a new set of 
cluster heads to maintain a connected structure) is initiated in 
ad hoc networks given that some criteria are fulfilled.  For 
example, in the LCC algorithm [10] re-clustering is initiated 
when two cluster heads come in range and in [11] lower 
overhead than LCC is demonstrated if the cluster head change 
is deferred for a period of time which depends on the speed of 
the two moving cluster heads that meet.  We assume here that 
re-clustering is initiated by the current local CH when its 
energy drops below a specific threshold value [12].  In that 
case the following actions are taken place:  
 
Step1: SAnoVS is taking place. 
Step2: CH starts a Voting_period timer.   
Step3: CH broadcasts a Voting_initiation message to his (n 
known) cluster members along with the + − 1	 Lagrange 
coefficients.  
Step4: On reception of the Voting_initiation message the 
cluster members: 
a) Recover the session key CK.  
b) Apply our candidate selection procedure described 
in A, this section, to identify their vote (the resource-
less current CH is excluded from the candidates). 
c) Unicast to the current CH a Voting_response 
message including their pseudo-random coordinates 
and their candidate vote encrypted with the CK 
recovered from a).  
Step5: On reception of the Voting_response(s) the current 
CH checks for double votes received from exactly the same 
pseudo-random coordinates and if no duplicate exists stores 
the encrypted votes in a Voting _table otherwise drops the 
duplicate votes. 
Step6: When the Voting_period timer expires, the CH 
decrypts the secured votes using the CK and stores the 
collected votes per each candidate in the Voting _table. New 
CH is the node with the maximum number of collected votes. 
The current CH broadcasts a CH_Announcement message with 
the ID of the elected new CH. 
Step7: The nodes that hear the CH_Announcement message 
unicast a Registration message including their ID to affiliate 
with the new CH. 
Step8: The new CH collects the memberships and unicasts 
a Confirmation message to each member (leadership is now 
ceded). 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Our scheme follows well-defined cryptographic 
assumptions: the intractability of computing the elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), the hardness of 
inverting a one-way function and the pseudo-randomness of 
the coordinates.  If these assumptions can be solved easily, 
then SAnoVS cannot provide user anonymity and data 
privacy. Considering that, each cluster node U ∈ B 
dynamically generates an elliptic curve key pair, whose secret 
key Z ∈ 1, p − 1 i.e., x, y ∈ 1, p − 1, is already known to 
the cluster nodes and public key Q  is broadcasted to them.  
Therefore, this section presents several attack scenarios to 
demonstrate the security of the proposed scheme. 
Attack scenario 1: Assume an attacker captures Q and tries 
to find the secret key Z.  In order to find the pseudo-random 
coordinates Z , the attacker either need to solve ECDLP or  
brute force the [1, p-1] space.  
Attack scenario 2: Assume an attacker collects the message 
M = Z$, V, T, cS?, cS? , … , c in the Dealer Setup phase and 
then tries to find the identity of the cluster nodes.  If an 
attacker knows the attending cluster node secret key Z, they 
can obtain the participants’ identity from M. However, 
computing Z from the public value is equivalent to solving the 
ECDLP. 
Attack scenario 3: Assume a cluster node U ∈ B  tries to 
find the identity of another neighboring node.  The cluster 
nodes U ∈ B  can easily reconstruct the share secret CK.  
However, it is infeasible to find the identity of another 
neighboring node since the node identities are not included at 
any stage of the proposed scheme.   
Attack scenario 4: Assume an attacker that does not belong 
to the cluster tries to reveal the common share secret CK from 
the message M in DS phase.  The attacker first computes the 
hash value h = Hk$	||	Z$	||	Z	||	T			||	m , then tries to 
recover the share CK based on the knowledge of the message 
M.  However, non-cluster node has not the ability to obtain h, 
because the difficulty involved in generating the coordinates 
Z is based on the ECDLP. 
Attack scenario 5: An attacker tries to replay an intercepted 
message M = Z$, V, T, cS?, cS? , … , c  to impersonate the 
cluster head U$  to hold the voting procedure.  The attacker 
shoud set a new acceptable timestamp T, so that the cluster 
nodes can verify the validity of T in DS phase.  Then, the 
cluster nodes compute k$ and h to solve the CK and ckeck 
the validity of CK by verifying HCK	||	Z$	||	T		 = V .  
However, the attacker can not forge a valid CK without 
knowing Z$ from Q$ .  To obtain Z$  from Q$  is equivalent to 
solving the ECDLP.  The cluster nodes can verify the validity 
of V at SC recovery stage.  Therefore, an attacker cannot 
obtain any secret by replaying an intercepted message of 
equation (2), i.e., M = Z$, V, T, cS?, cS? , … , c. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When clusters need to select their head node in ad-hoc 
networks it is desirable all cluster members to participate in 
this procedure.  The most popular selection procedure is 
through voting and vote privacy can be achieved through 
encryption with the use of a share secret key.  Therefore, in 
the context of secure clustered ad hoc networks we have 
proposed improvements on calculating and distributing a 
shared secret key without revealing the identities of the 
participating nodes. Moreover, linear threshold schemes with 
elliptic curve cryptographic techniques are applied to 
distribute such shares.  In particular, we have used pseudo-
random coordinates of the participating nodes during the 
public key generation stage; during the set up of the ephemeral 
shared secret; and during voting of the new cluster heads.  Our 
scheme has been evaluated with attack scenarios and proved 
that we overcome the vulnerabilities of the previously 
proposed schemes.  
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